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Granting network providers pricing flexibility should reduce




BY CHRISTOPHER S. YOO
University of Pennsylvania Law School
etwork neutrality has received sus-
tained attention from both policymak-
ers and academic commentators for the
past several years, and it shows no signs
of retreating from the forefront of the
policy debate. President Obama effec-
tively ensured that network neutrality
will remain at the top of the policy agenda by including pro-
visions in the 2009 stimulus package that require the Federal
Communications Commission to formulate a national broad-
band plan. The stimulus package also requires that grants
made by the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration comply with four network neutrality princi-
ples first articulated by the fcc in 2005. On October 22,
2009, the fcc initiated proceedings to codify and expand the
2005 principles. President Obama reaffirmed his support
for network neutrality in a YouTube interview conducted
shortly after his 2010 State of the Union address.
Pinning down a precise definition of network neutrality is
difficult. Roughly speaking, it requires network providers to
route traffic without regard to the source or content of the
packets of data thatmove across the Internet, the application
with which those packets are associated, or the sender’s will-
ingness to pay. In the words of leading network neutrality pro-
ponent Lawrence Lessig, “Net neutralitymeans simply that all
like Internet content must be treated alike and move at the
same speed over the network.”
It would be surprising if any two similar packets would be
treated exactly alike when traveling through a network con-
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sisting of more than 30,000 autonomous systems that deter-
mine their terms of interconnection through arms-length
negotiations. Indeed, many commentators have noted that
such equal treatment did not occur over much of the
Internet’s past, when it was far less complex. Now, systemat-
ic changes in the architecture of the Internet make identical
treatment even less likely, yet the changes are largely the
result of network providers’ attempts to reduce cost, manage
congestion, and maintain quality of service. These changes
may not represent network providers’ efforts to promote
their self interests at the expense of the public, as some net-
work neutrality proponents have suggested, but instead they
have the potential to yield substantial benefits both to indi-
vidual consumers and to society as a whole.
THE EARLY INTERNET
When the Internet first emerged, its topology and the busi-
ness relationships comprising it were relatively simple. The
Internet evolved out of the National Science Foundation’s
nsfnet backbone, which was created in 1986 (and decom-
missioned in 1997) to provide universities all over the coun-
try with access to federally funded supercomputing centers
located at five major universities. The primary architects of
nsfnet decided to give it a tripartite structure. At the topwas
thensfnet backbone, which at its peak connected 16 research
facilities across the country. At the bottom were the campus
networks run by individual universities. In the middle were
regional networks (typically operated by university consortia
or state-university partnerships) that linked the campus net-
works to the major computing centers.
Every data packet had to travel through a parallel path tra-
versing each level of the hierarchy. For example, traffic orig-
inating on one campus network would have to connect to the
regional network with which it was associated, which hand-
























ed off the traffic to the nsfnet backbone, which in turn
handed it off to the regional network that served the desti-
nation campus network. The result was to create a series of
parallel hierarchies through which all traffic had to traverse.
The network retained this same basic architecture when it
was privatized during themid-1990s. Thensfnet backbone
at the top of the hierarchy was replaced by a series of private
backbone providers that interconnected with one another at
four public network access points established by theNational
Science Foundation. The campus networks at the bottom of
the hierarchy were replaced by last-mile providers that trans-
ported traffic from local distribution facilities located in
individual cities (which in the case of digital subscriber lines
are usually called “central offices” and in the case of cable
modem systems are usually called “headend”) to end users’ res-
idences and places of business. The regional networks evolved
into regional Internet service providers (isps) that trans-
ported traffic between the four network access points served
by backbone providers and the central offices and headends
maintained by last-mile providers.
The privatization of the Internet did not change the hier-
archical nature of the basic architecture. Each regional isp still
connected to a single backbone provider, and each last-mile
provider still connected to a single regional isp. Indeed, the
early versions of the routing protocol employed by the back-
bones (known as “border gateway protocol”) would not sup-
port more complex topologies.
This architecture conferred a number of advantages. It
constituted a “spanning tree” that connected all of the nodes
with the minimum number of links. Furthermore, the fact
that the path between any two nodes was unique greatly sim-
plified determining the path along which traffic should be
routed. That said, tree architectures are also subject to a
number of drawbacks. The uniqueness of the path connect-
ing any two nodes means that the failure of any link or node
in the network will inevitably disconnect part of the net-
work. Even when all network elements are operating proper-
ly, if the rate at which traffic arrives exceeds any particular ele-
ment’s capacity to route the traffic, that network element will
become congested and the quality of service providedwill dete-
riorate. In addition, the hierarchical structure made each
network participant completely dependent on the players
operating at the level above them, which in turn provided
backbones with a potential source of market power.
Peering and Transit The early Internet was also character-
ized by relatively simple business relationships. End users
typically purchased Internet access through some formof “all-
you-can-eat” pricing, which allowed them to consume as
much bandwidth as they would like for a single flat rate.
Relationships between network providers typically fell into two
categories. Tier-1 isps entered into “peering” relationships
with one another, in which they exchanged traffic on a set-
tlement-free basis and nomoney changed hands. The primary
justification for foregoing payment is transaction costs.
Although the backbones could meter and bill each other for
the traffic they exchanged, they could avoid the cost of doing
so without suffering any economic harm so long as the traf-
fic they exchanged was roughly symmetrical; such arrange-
ments would not be economical if the traffic being exchanged
were severely imbalanced. Thus tier-1 isps will not peer with
other networks that are unable tomaintain aminimum level
of traffic volume. In addition, peering partners typically
require that inbound and outbound traffic not exceed a cer-
tain ratio. Networks that cannot meet these requirements
must enter into “transit” arrangements in which they pay the
backbone to provide connectivity to the rest of the Internet.
Most early analyses of these arrangements focused on
their financial terms. What is often overlooked is that inter-
connection agreements covered two distinct functions: the
sending and receiving of traffic, and the announcing to the
rest of the Internet where ip addresses served by various
providers are located. To understand this latter function,
consider the perspective of a small network, A, that serves a
small number of its own customers and purchases access to
the rest of the Internet through another isp. The transit
agreement between A and the ispwould not only require the
isp to receive traffic sent by A and to deliver traffic bound to
A, but also require the isp to announce to the rest of the
Internet how to reach the ip prefixes associated with A’s cus-
tomers. In addition, A can maintain a very simple routing
table — it need only keep track of the prefixes of the customers
that it serves; for all ip addresses outside of A, it can enter a
“default route” into its routing table that directs all other traf-
fic to the other isp.
The existence of default routes creates a potential prob-
lem. If none of the routing tables involved in a particular
routing session contained the location of the destination, by
default the networks would simply hand the packets back and
forth continuously and the packets would never reach their
final destination. The only way to avoid this problem is for
one or more network providers to maintain routing tables
that map the entire Internet without employing any default
routes. Thus, tier-1 isps are defined not only by their engag-
ing in settlement-free peering with one another, but also by
their maintaining routing tables that contain no defaults.
Peering contracts also include a number of other require-
ments to guard against free riding and to ensure the proper
functioning of the network.
THE INTERNET’S EVOLUTION
Over the past decade, isps have begun to enter intomore com-
plex interconnection arrangements that deviate from the
strict tripartite hierarchy that characterized the early Internet.
In addition, content providers have begun to experiment
with a variety of ways to locate their content closer to end
users. Both types of changes have significant implications that
have largely been overlooked in the policy debate.
Private Peering, Multihoming, and Secondary Peering One of
the first problems to emerge in the early Internet was con-
gestion at the four network access points, which often caused
throughput times and network reliability to degrade. Some
estimate that this congestion caused packet loss at rates as
high as 40 percent. As the network access points became
increasingly congested, backbones began to find it advanta-
geous to exchange traffic at private interconnection points,
a practice known as “private peering.”
In addition, regional isps have begun to connect to more
than one backbone, a practice known as “multihoming,” in
part to protect against service outages and to limit their vul-
nerability to any exertion of market power by a backbone.
Regional isps that did not have sufficient volume to peer with
the tier-1 backbones also began to find that they did have suf-
ficient volume to peer with other regional isps, a practice
known as “secondary peering.” Enabling regional isps to
exchange traffic on a settlement-free basis reduced the costs
borne by end users. In addition, secondary peering would
often shorten the number of hops needed for particular
packets to reach their final destination and make them sub-
ject to bilateral (as opposed tomultiparty) negotiations, both
of which should increase networks’ control over quality of
service. Secondary peering and multihoming also made the
network more robust by creating multiple paths through
24 REGULATION S P R I N G 2 0 1 0
T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S & T E C H N O L O G Y
REGULATION S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 25
ing tables. For similar reasons, a network may intentionally
route traffic over amore costly path if doing sowill help itmain-
tain its traffic within the ratios mandated by its peering con-
tract. Again, the effect is to introduce significant variance in the
speed with which similarly situated packets will arrive at their
destination and the cost that similarly situatedpacketswill have
to bear. This variance results not fromanticompetitivemotives,
but rather from networks’ attempts to minimize costs and
ensure quality of service in the face of a network topology that
is increasingly heterogeneous.
Server Farms and CDNS Large content providers have
begun to employ other means to reduce cost and manage
latency. One solution is to forgo maintaining a single large
server and instead to deploy multiple points of presence in
“carrier hotels” across the country. Doing so allows these
content providers to avoid paying transit charges to reach the
public backbone and instead transmit their traffic through
secondary peering arrangements with tier-2 isps. Greater
reliance on private networks also gives the content providers
greater control over network security and performance. A
recent study indicates thatGoogle, Yahoo!, andMicrosoft have
been able to use server farms to bypass the backbone alto-
gether for roughly a third of their traffic, and to keep their
number of hops for traffic that had to pass through the
backbone to no more than one or two.
On other occasions, content providers are distributing
their data through “content delivery networks” (cdns) such
as Akamai and Limelight. cdns in effect substitute storage for
long-distance networking capacity bymaintaining a network
of local caches across the Internet. When an end user sends a
request for a webpage hosted by acdn, that query is redirected
to the cache. cdns are thus able to use storage to serve mul-
tiple queries for the same content without using significant
network resources. The geographic dispersion of the caches
usually dictates that the file will be served by a location clos-
er than would be possible if all of the content were stored in
a central server, which minimizes cost and latency. The dis-
tributed nature of the caches also provides protection against
denial-of-service attacks and allows thecdn to redirect queries
to other caches when particular caches are overly congested.
cdns represent an innovative way to deal with the increas-
ing complexity of the Internet. The problem is that they are
nonneutral. cdns work best for static content; they are less
well suited to interactive content that changes dynamically.
More to the point, cdns are commercial services; thus greater
which network nodes could interconnect. In fact, as much as
70 percent of the nodes in the Internet can now communicate
with one another without passing through the public back-
bone. This had the additional benefit of weakening themar-
ket position of the top-tier backbones, since any breakdown
in the business relationship would not necessarily disconnect
the isp from the network and the ability to route along dif-
ferent paths places a natural limit on the backbones’ ability
to engage in supracompetitive pricing.
The emergence of interconnection relationships that devi-
ate from the strict hierarchy that characterized the early
Internet represents a substantial divergence from network
neutrality. For example, assume that an end user is down-
loading content frombothcnn.comandmsnbc.com. Assume
further that the end user’s regional isp has a secondary peer-
ing relationship with the regional isp serving cnn.com, but
does not have a secondary peering relationship with the
regional isp servingmsnbc.com. The absence of a secondary
peering relationshipmeans that traffic frommsnbc.comwill
have to pay transit charges, while traffic from cnn.com will
not. The result is that traffic that is functionally identical
will end up paying different amounts. The differences in
topology may also allow the traffic from cnn.com to main-
tain greater control over the quality of service.
The presence of multiple routes between these two points
also complicates routing decisions. The presence of multiple
paths connecting two points naturally means that someone
must decide along which path to route the traffic. Although
most networks choose routes that minimize the number of
hops, networksmay sometimes find it beneficial to route traf-
fic in order to satisfy other requirements of their intercon-
nection relationships. For example, a network may seek to
enhance efficiency by balancing the loads between the two
links. Multihomed entities can also monitor the quality of
service provided by each connection and route the most
delay-sensitive traffic along the link with the lowest latency.
In addition, transit contracts call for customers to pay a flat
fee up to a predetermined peak volume (known as the com-
mitted rate) and pay additional charges for any volume that
exceeds that level. For the same reason that consumerswith two
mobile telephones have the incentive to use up all of the pre-
paidminutes on both lines before incurring any additional per-
minute charges,multihomed entities have the incentive to uti-
lize all of their committed rate before paying additional fees.
This lowers overall transit cost, but requires diverting some traf-
fic along a path that is longer than the one stored in the rout-
Secondary peering and multihoming have
the benefit of weakening the market position
of the top-tier backbones.
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reliability and quality of service are available only to those who
are willing to pay for them.
To the extent that cdns use the public backbone to deliv-
er the content to their caches, they are best regarded as an over-
lay to the existing network. Increasingly, however, cdns and
server farms are bypassing the public backbone altogether and
connecting to their caches through private networks, in the
process transforming cdns into a fundamentally different
architecture.
All of these developments represent innovative adjust-
ments to the realities of the Internet. The differences in topol-
ogy mean that traffic that is otherwise similar may travel
through the network at different speeds, with different costs,
and with different levels of quality of service.
THE EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
The evolution of the Internet has not been restricted to topol-
ogy. Network participants have also been experimenting with
an increasingly broad range of business arrangements. Some
of these innovations have been driven by the increasing sig-
nificance of peer-to-peer technologies. Other important devel-
opments are partial transit and paid peering.
Peer-To-Peer One of the primary forces causing business
relationships to change is the growing importance of appli-
cations using peer-to-peer technologies. The traditional
Internet employed what is known as a client-server architec-
ture, in which files are stored in large computers at central-
ized locations (servers) and end users (clients) request files
from those computers. The relationship is generally regard-
ed as hierarchical, and the amount of data uploaded by clients
is very small relative to the amount of data downloaded by
servers. In the classic example of theWorldWideWeb, client
traffic consists solely of uniform resource locators (urls), the
short bits of code identifying a particular website address.
Server traffic, which consists of the data comprising the
requested website, is much larger. For this reason, the tech-
nologies that took the early lead in broadband deployment
(cablemodem service anddsl) adapted an asymmetric archi-
tecture, allocating a larger proportion of the available band-
width to downloading than to uploading. Newer technologies,
such as fiber andwireless broadband, follow the same pattern.
Peer-to-peer technologies follow a very different approach.
Edge computers in a peer-to-peer architecture are not divid-
ed into those that host files and those that request files.
Instead, computers simultaneously perform both functions.
Because this relationship is regarded as less hierarchical than
client-server relationships, the computers in this architec-
ture are known as peers and communications between them
are known as peer-to-peer. Peer-to-peer is thus not synony-
mous with file sharing or user-generated content, as is often
mistakenly assumed. On the contrary, many peer-to-peer
applications (such as Vuze) support commercial broadcast
services, and many platforms for user-generated content
(such as YouTube) employ centralized servers. The real sig-
nificance of the term “peer-to-peer” lies in the nature of the
network architecture.
It is not yet clear what proportion of network traffic will
follow each architecture. For example, peer-to-peer traffic
had consistently outstripped client-server traffic for several
years leading up to 2007. In 2007, however, client-server traf-
fic staged a comeback, thanks primarily to the expansion of
streaming video services like YouTube, and exceeded peer-to-
peer traffic 45 percent to 37 percent.Many industry observers
now predict that although peer-to-peer will remain important,
it will decline as a percentage of total Internet traffic over the
next several years. Even so, it is clear that peer-to-peer traffic
is likely to remain a more important component of network
traffic than during the Internet’s early years.
The growing importance of peer-to-peer technologies is
causing significant congestion in certain areas of the network
and is putting pressure on the traditional approach to pric-
ing network services. The emergence of end users as impor-
tant sources of data is putting severe pressure on the limited
bandwidth allocated to upload traffic. In addition, unlike in
a client-server architecture where end users usually only gen-
erate traffic when a person is seated at the keyboard, edge com-
puters in a peer-to-peer architecture can generate traffic for
as long as the computer is left running. The result is that the
lion’s share of upload traffic is generated by a small number
of superheavy peer-to-peer users. As few as 5 percent of end
usersmay be responsible for generatingmore than 50 percent
of all Internet traffic.
The most recent generation of peer-to-peer technologies
can exacerbate congestion still further. In the first generation
of peer-to-peer technologies, each end user stored the entire-
ty of the files that the user hosted. As a result, anyone request-
ing those files was limited by the total bandwidth and the level
of congestion associated with the network connection
attached to that end user’s computer. Technologies such as
BitTorrent follow a different approach. Instead of storing
entire files in one location, BitTorrent divides each file into
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The differences in topology mean that
traffic that is otherwise similar may travel through
the network at different speeds, with different costs.
pieces and distributes them at multiple locations around
the Internet. When a BitTorrent user requests a file, the soft-
ware then retrieves the various pieces from multiple com-
puters at the same time, which reduces the amount of band-
width required from any one peer and improves download
performance. BitTorrent also dynamically reallocates requests
for pieces away from the slowest connections and toward the
fastest connections, thereby placing the heaviest burden on
those peers with the fast connections.
The congestion caused by peer-to-peer technologies weighs
heaviest on last-mile technologies that share bandwidth local-
ly, such as cable modem and wireless broadband systems.
For example, cable modem technology requires that sub-
scribers share bandwidth with the other households operat-
ing through the same neighborhood node. As a result, cable
modem customers are significantly more vulnerable to the
downloading habits of their immediate neighbors than are
telephone-based broadband systems, which offer dedicated
local connections. Service can slow to a crawl if as few as 15
of the 500 or so users sharing the same node are using peer-
to-peer applications to download files.
The classic economic solution to congestion is to set the
price of incremental network usage equal to the congestion
costs imposed on the network by that usage. However, deter-
mining the congestion cost imposed by any particular user at
any particular time can be quite complex. Subscribers that use
large amounts of bandwidth can contribute very little to net-
work congestion if they confine their usage to hours when net-
work usage is low. Conversely, subscribers that use only small
amounts of bandwidth may nonetheless impose significant
congestion costs on the network if they generate traffic at peak
times. The contribution of any particular usage cannot be
determined simply by counting the number of bits being
transmitted. The overall impact of any particular increase in
network usage can only be determined in light of other sub-
scribers’ Internet usage. Thus itmaymake sense to charge dif-
ferent amounts to users who are using the Internet to access
the same content or application if a sufficient number of other
users sharing the same bandwidth are using the network at
the same time.
The growth of peer-to-peer technologies has also height-
ened the pressure on themodels that network providers have
used to price their services. As noted earlier, the traditional
approach charges content and application providers prices
that increase with the peak bandwidth consumed, while end
users are charged on an unmetered basis. The fact that every
download had to pass through one link that charged on a vol-
ume-sensitive basis allowed this pricing approach to serve as
a reasonable approximation of efficient congestion pricing.
For example, 100 downloads of a 700megabytemovie would
generate 70 gigabytes of traffic from the server, which in
turn would be reflected in the price paid by the content
provider to its isp.
The situation is quite different under peer-to-peer archi-
tecture. In that case, the movie could be downloaded once
from the server, and the remaining 99 downloads could be
served by other end users running the same peer-to-peer
software. Because end users are provided with service on an
all-you-can-eat basis, the additional 99 downloads served
by the peer-to-peer network do not generate any additional
revenue. The only revenue received by the network is for the
initial 700megabyte download. Thus, in a peer-to-peer archi-
tecture, the amounts that content providers pay under the
traditional pricing regime no longer serve as a workable
approximation of the total traffic they impose on the net-
work. Moreover, the failure to charge network participants
prices that reflect their incremental contribution to con-
gestion causes excessive consumption of network resources
that ultimately harms consumers.
It thus comes as no surprise that the network providers
that are most subject to local congestion are experimenting
with othermeans formanaging the congestion caused by peer-
to-peer applications. For example, TimeWarner has recently
experimented with bandwidth caps and other forms of
metered pricing. Although many network neutrality propo-
nents have no objection to metered pricing, recent attempts
to impose metered pricing and bandwidth caps have met
such a hostile reaction from the network neutrality commu-
nity that the network providers had to back down. That said,
metered pricing is far from a panacea. As I have discussed in
greater detail elsewhere, true congestion-based pricing would
vary from moment to moment based on the volume of traf-
fic introduced into the network by other users. Such a pric-
ing regime would challenge consumers’ ability to process the
relevant information, and the distributed nature of the
Internet means that no one entity has the information need-
ed to formulate such policies. As a result, other network
providers have turned to proxies that are strongly associated
with high-volume activity, whichmost importantly includes
a ban on operating a server as required by peer-to-peer tech-
nologies. Although this would constitute a violation of net-
work neutrality by discriminating against a particular type of
application, even network neutrality proponents acknowl-
edge that such a restriction represents a good proxy for band-
width-intensive activity.
Partial Transit and Paid Peering Network providers have
also begun to enter into business relationships that go beyond
peering and transit relationships that dominated the early
Internet. Some are driven by the emergence of secondary
peering relationships discussed above. Before such relation-
ships existed, a tier-2 or tier-3 isp would have to buy transit
from a tier-1 isp that had obtained access to all of the ip
addresses that it did not serve. In other words, a tier-2 or tier-
3 isp’s transit relationships would cover the entire Internet
(except for its own customers).
The advent of secondary peering reduces the scope of
transit services that the isp needs to purchase. The isp no
longer needs to buy transit to the entire Internet; the sec-
ondary peering relationships already provide the ispwith the
ability to reach those customers served by its secondary peer-
ing partners. As a result, these isps have begun to purchase
partial transit that covers only those portions of the Internet
not already covered by their secondary peering relationships.
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In addition, an isp with inbound traffic that far exceeds its
outbound trafficmay run the risk of having traffic ratios that
put it in violation of its peering contract. Under these cir-
cumstances, it may attempt to cover its deficit in outbound
traffic by selling a partial transit contract that covers only out-
bound traffic, but not inbound traffic. Alternatively, it may
reduce its inbound traffic by buying partial transit for
inbound traffic.
Another interesting development is the emergence of paid
peering, which involves all of the same aspects as conventional
peering relationships. Peers announce to the rest of the
Internet the addresses that their peering partners control,
maintain a sufficient number of interconnection points
across the country, and maintain the requisite total volume
and traffic ratios. The key difference is that one peering part-
ner pays the other partner for its services.
Paid peering is driven by both supply-side and demand-side
considerations. Starting first with the supply side, settle-
ment-free peering arrangements between tier-1 isps with
similar traffic volumes make sense only if both networks
have similar costs. Over time, backbones have begun to serve
two different types of last-mile networks: those such as Cogent
and Abovenet that primarily serve content and application
providers (which are sometimes called “content networks”),
and those such as Comcast and Verizon that serve end users
(which are sometimes called “eyeball networks”). The costs of
the first type of network are quite low, typically only requir-
ing a single high-speed line to a small number of business loca-
tions. The costs of the second type of network are consider-
ably higher, requiring the wiring and upgrading of equipment
in entire neighborhoods. The presence of such asymmetric
costs provides a substantial impetus for cash to flow fromnet-
works serving content and application providers to networks
providing connections to end users.
These supply-side considerations are reinforced by demand-
side considerations associated with the economics of two-
sided markets, which illustrates the potential benefits of
allowing network providers to charge differential prices to
both end users and content and application providers.
Conventional economics has long recognized the existence of
“network economic effects,” which cause a network to increase
in value as the number of users connected to it increases. To
use a classic example, the value of a telephone network to a
particular consumer depends in part on the number of other
subscribers connected to the network; the more people you
can reach through the network, themore valuable it becomes.
The benefits created by the network economic effect for
telephone networks arise with respect to a single class of cus-
tomers. When a market is two-sided, instead of bringing
together a single class of similarly situated users, networks
bring together two completely different classes of users. In
those cases, the value is determined not by the number of users
of the same class, but rather by the number of users of the
other class. A classic example is broadcast television, which
brings together two groups: viewers and advertisers.
Advertisers gain no benefit (and if anything suffer a detriment)
from belonging to a network with a large number of other
advertisers. The value of the network for advertisers is instead
determined solely by the number of viewers, i.e., the size of the
other class of users.
The literature suggests that social welfare would be max-
imized if the network provider were permitted to price dis-
criminate on both sides of the two-sided market. It also sug-
gests that the prices paid on each side of the market can
differ widely, and that in many cases it is economically ben-
eficial for one side to subsidize the other side. The fact that
the Internet has become increasingly dominated by advertis-
ing revenue paid to content and application providers suggests
that it may be socially beneficial for content and application
providers to subsidize the prices paid by end users. An adver-
tiser’s willingness to pay for an ad on a particular website
depends on the number of end users viewing that website.
Under these circumstances, the optimal solution may be for
the website owner to subsidize the total number of end users
by making payments to the network provider to help defray
their costs of connection. The costs of subsidizingmore users
would be more than offset by the additional revenue gener-
ated by the fact that advertisers can now reach more poten-
tial customers. In the case of broadband, this would be both
economically efficient and would be a boon to consumers
both in terms of providing service in more geographic areas
and in reducing the prices that consumers pay.
These dynamics are again well illustrated by broadcast
television. Inmanyways, broadcast television and the Internet
are analogous. The studios that create television programs
play a similar role to content and application providers.
Television networks aggregate programs and deliver them
nationally inmuch the samemanner as content networks and
backbone providers. Local broadcast stations provide last-mile
connectivity that is quite similar to the role played by eyeball
networks. In addition, the revenue structure is quite compa-
rable, in that television networks receive advertising revenue
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Social welfare would be maximized
if the network provider could price discriminate
on both sides of the two-sided market.
in much the same manner as content and application
providers. Furthermore, the cost structure is somewhat sim-
ilar in that connecting individual homes is muchmore cost-
ly than distributing programming nationally.
For decades, the standard business arrangement has been
for television networks to subsidize the operations of local
broadcast stations by paying them to bemembers of their tel-
evision networks. The industry’s revenue and cost structure
make such arrangements quite logical. The cost of paying
these broadcast stations to affiliate with a network is more
than offset by the increase in advertising revenue made pos-
sible by the fact that the network is now able to reach a larg-
er audience. Broadcast television thus represents a prime
example of when firms operating on one side of the market
find it economically beneficial to subsidize end users on the
other side of the market.
Furthermore, themagnitude of the affiliation fees that the
networks pay to broadcast stations is anything but uniform.
The precise amount varies with the relative strength of the
network and the relative strength of the broadcast station.
Stronger broadcast stations receive more, while weaker ones
receive less. Equally interesting is the fact that in recent
years, the cash flow has begun to vary in its direction as well
as magnitude, with weaker stations having to pay rather
than being paid to be part of the television network. The
dynamic nature of this pricing regime benefits consumers by
providing incentives for networks to invest in better quality
programming and by providing an incentive for stations to
provide better carriage.
The two-sided market analysis reveals the potential draw-
backs of preventing network providers from charging differ-
ential prices. As a general matter, pricing flexibility makes it
easier for network providers to recover the costs of building
additional bandwidth. Granting network providers pricing
flexibility with respect to content and application providers
should reduce the percentage of the network costs borne by
consumers. Conversely, preventing network providers from
exercising pricing flexibility with respect to content and
application providers would simply increase the proportion
of the network costs that providers must recover directly
from end users. This simultaneously raises the prices paid by
consumers and decreases the likelihood that the capital
improvements will ever be built. Charging content and appli-
cation providers differential prices thus has the potential to
increase social welfare and can reduce, not increase, the bur-
den borne by consumers.
CONCLUSION
It is all too easy to forget that the Internet is not a monolith
with a brooding omnipresence overseeing the entire system.
Instead, it is a collection of autonomous systems that deter-
mine the terms of interconnection between them through a
series of arms-length negotiations. Given the Internet’s
essence as a network of networks, it should come as no sur-
prise that no two packets will pay the same amount for the
same service.
The developments that I have outlined in this article have
made such differences even more likely. The network no
longer adheres to the rigid and uniform hierarchy that char-
acterized the early Internet and its predecessor, nsfnet.
Data packets can now travel along radically different paths
based on the topology of the portion of the network through
which they travel. This is the inevitable result of reducing costs
and experimenting with new structures. At the same time that
network providers are experimenting with new topologies,
they are also experimenting with new business relationships.
Gone are the days when networks interconnected through
peering and transit and imposed all-you-can-eat pricing on all
end users. That fairly simple and uniform set of contractual
arrangements has been replaced by amuchmore complex set
of business relationships that reflect creative solutions to an
increasingly complex set of economic problems. Again, these
differences mean that the service that any particular packet
receives and the amount that it pays will vary with the busi-
ness relationships between the networks through which it
travels. Although many observers reflexively view such devi-
ations from the status quo with suspicion, in many (if not
most) cases, they represent nothingmore than the natural evo-
lution of a network trying to respond to an ever-growing
diversity of customer demands. Imposing regulation that
would thwart such developments threatens to increase costs
and discourage investment in ways that ultimately work to the
detriment of the consumers that such regulation is ostensi-
bly designed to protect.
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